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ARGUMENT 
Defendants admission, "Defendants agree with the majority of Plaintiffs' 
'Statements of the Case,'" is no small admission. For therein the defendants admit, of 
course, that the plaintiffs have suffered an injury for which the defendants are potentially 
liable, but defendants also freely admit that plaintiffs filed a notice of claim within a year 
of the accident, that the notices of claim were sent to and received at the county clerk's 
office and Karla Johnson, the Clerk Auditor of Kane County signed for the notices. 
Nevertheless, the defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims should be summarily defeated. 
Therefore, the notice was in fact delivered to the county clerk's office and the 
County Clerk Auditor signed for the notice. The real dispute in this matter is the effect of 
plaintiffs' failure to "direct" the notice to the county clerk, so far as that term is construed 
to mean that the notice must bear the clerk's name, since there is no real dispute that the 
notices were sent to the address of the county clerk. 
Because the facts and circumstances of this case present a situation where the 
purposes of the notices statute have been fully met, and circumstances exist upon which 
the plaintiffs reasonably relied that they had fulfilled the notice requirements, the trial 
court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss must be reversed. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS SUFFICIENT 
Defendants allege that plaintiffs' failure to "direct" the notice to the county clerk 
renders the notice fatally defective. Defendants' analysis ignores a salient fact. To 
accept defendants analysis this court must hold that unless the county clerk's name is 
found on the notice, the notice is defective. In this case the notices was addressed to the 
office where the county clerk is found. In this sense the notice was "directed" and 
"delivered" to the office of the county clerk. Karla Johnson, the person signing for the 
notice, by her own admission "handles the clerk portion of the statutes" (See Exhibit "A" 
deposition of Karla Johnson p. 5, line 6-8). 
Defendant's argument ignores the most elementary distinction between the facts of 
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp..1 and the present factual scenario. In Bellonio, the 
notice was sent to the airport attorney, an attorney representing the entity of the airport, 
and not to the city attorney or any person representing the city, where the city was the 
entity concerned. In other words, the Bellonio case presents a scenario where no notice 
was given to the proper entity. Thereby, defendants missed the critical distinction in 
Bellonio, where the court found that the airport attorney was not the agent for the city. 
In contrast, in the present circumstances county clerk's office received the notice 
and the county clerk auditor signed for them herself. 
Defendants have not argued that Kane County did not have an opportunity to settle 
this matter without the expenses of litigation. The defendants have not argued that the 
notices were untimely or otherwise defective. In fact, the attorneys for Kane county 
acted upon the notices of claim. Thus, the defendants cannot argue that the purposes of 
the notice claim statutes have not been fulfilled. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 
UT 36,^1 20, 977, P.2d 1201. 
Conspicuously absent form the defendants' analysis is any argument that they 
have been prejudiced in any way. In the present circumstances, addressing the notices to 
the county commissioners in no way inhibited the settlement of plaintiffs' claims without 
resort to litigation. In a related case, where the auto insurance brought suit for 
subrogation Kane County confirmed that Kane County had a full opportunity to pursue 
the claim as a result of the notice that was served. (See Exhibit "B" stipulation). 
Defendants claim that the holding of Brittain v. State bv and through Utah Dept. of 
Employ., 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) has no application to the present case. Once 
again, defendants ignore the proposition for which Brittain was offered. First, Brittain 
explained the purposes of the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
that is, to "afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and 
timely investigation" and "to arrive at a timely settlement if appropriate" to avoid the 
expenses of litigation. Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671. Again, there is no question but that 
those purposes have been fulfilled in the present case. 
Further, Brittain essentially allowed for substantial compliance with the statutory 
notice requirements. The Brittain court's holding, in the final analysis, was that the 
plaintiff had fulfilled the requirements of the notice statute because the way the plaintiff 
had viewed the statute was reasonable. In the present case, the purposes of the statutes 
were fulfilled and the plaintiffs acted reasonably in relying upon the representations of 
the Kane County attorney and the written confirmation of the attorneys hired for Kane 
County that they possess the notices. 
Finally, it is hardly inappropriate for the plaintiffs to cite the case of Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) when reviewing the purposes of the 
Governmental Immunity Act where this and other Utah appellate courts have cited the 
1
 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App.. 1996). 
case for similar purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act where this and other Utah 
appellate courts have cited the case for similar purposes. See Larson v. Park City Mun. 
Corp.. 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998); Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1297; BischeL 907 P.2d at 278; 
Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671. Further, while the Stahl court did not rest its opinion on the 
doctrine of estoppel, the court did review the facts and circumstances of the case in that 
light. Lastly, plaintiffs maintain that the distinction between the Transit Act and the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not survive scrutiny. Both statutes provide that notice 
"shall" be filed within a proscribed period. This court should take this opportunity to 
adopt a common standard for such notice requirements. 
Because the facts and circumstances of this case present a situation where the 
purposes of the notices statute have been fully met, and circumstances exist upon which 
the plaintiffs reasonably relied that they had fulfilled the notice requirements, the trial 
court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss must be reversed. 
II. ONLY SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS TO 
THE DELIVERY OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
There is no dispute in the present matter that a notice of claim was presented 
months before it would have been due and delivered to Kane County by way of the Kane 
County Clerk's office. The Clerk Auditor signed for the certified letters enclosing the 
notice of claims. It is further undisputed that the defendants acted upon these notices of 
claim: the county attorney wrote to plaintiffs counsel acknowledging possession of the 
notices of claim, and the attorneys hired for Kane County likewise acknowledged 
possession of the notices of claim and requested further information. Defendants in no 
wise argue to this court that strict compliance is the best rule of the State of Utah. 
Instead, the sole argument of the defendants is that strict compliance has been the rule of 
law for some time, should therefore be honored as tradition, and should therefore be 
rashly enforced in the present circumstances. 
However, as outlined in plaintiffs' principle brief, the strict compliance 
requirement in Utah is judicially created. In fact, plaintiffs have pointed out that this 
court accepted substantial compliance as the standard prior to its setting forth the strict 
compliance standard. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966). 
Citizens should be able to bring claims against the government where the 
government or its agents have acted negligently. While limitation must be placed on 
meritorious claims, those limitations can reasonably be fulfilled by requiring strict 
compliance with the timing provisions of that statue, but allowing for substantial 
compliance as to the form of the notice and its deliver. After all, a plaintiff must meet 
two effective statues of limitation to bring a claim; first, the notice of claim must be 
timely, and second the lawsuit itself must be filed within a year of the denial, express or 
implied of the claim. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-14 (1965) and 63-30-15(2)(1987). 
The factual background of this case shows how a better standard leads to more just 
results. This court can continue to enforce the time requirements of the notice. There 
must be a deadline somewhere in order for stability to be obtained. Likewise, this court 
can continue to expect litigants to give notice to the appropriate entity. Clearly, and 
entity cannot act upon a notice it never receives. However, where the correct entity 
timely receives the notice and is afforded an opportunity to act thereon, the standard of 
substantial compliance should be adopted. 
CONCLUSION 
BischeL Thimmes, and its progeny argue for allowing substantial compliance in 
"unique" circumstances and where "the facts may be found with such certainty, and the 
institute suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the exception." 
Never has the situation occurred where the notice of claim would have been 
sufficient on its face a mere one year earlier. Never has the situation occurred where the 
notice of claim would have been sufficient on its face for the previous 25 years. 
Certainly manifest injustice would be suffered in this case. 
Because Kane County, the entity concerned, received the notice of claim, the 
proper recipient for the notice of claim did in fact possess the notice of claim and because 
injustice would occur not to include this matter as an exception the trial court's decision 
to dismiss the matter must be reversed. Further, for the other reasons outlined in 
plaintiffs' brief, the trial court's conclusion must be reversed and the matter be remanded 
for trial. 
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VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971 
JOHNSON 5-1-01 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What is your occupation? 
A. I'm the Kane County clerk auditor. 
Q. Define the term, "Kane County clerk 
auditor," would you, please. 
A. I handle all of the clerk portion of the 
statute, as well as the auditor portion of the 
statute. 
Q. Okay. Tell me your job description as far 
as clerk is concerned. 
A. I do the elections. I provide the 
clerical for the Sixth District Court, and various 
other duties as assigned. 
Q. And how long have you been engaged in this 
capacity? 
A. Nine and a half years. 
Q. Are you also acquainted with the Kane 
County Commission? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What is your relationship with the 
Kane County Commission? 
A. We have a working relationship. 
Q. Define the term, "working relationship," 
please. 
A. We work together in the same county. 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. STIRBA: Counsel and I have had a 
discussion about Deputy McPherson's deposition, 
which is scheduled for May 2nd, and counsel has 
indicated that the purpose of Deputy McPherson's 
deposition was to elicit information about whether 
or not the county has conducted an investigation 
relating to the claim involving the accident that 
relates to the Bear River matter. And as we both 
are aware, and I think we're in agreement, that the 
supreme court has said that one of the purposes of a 
Notice of Claim is to allow the governmental entity 
to have a chance to investigate the merits of the 
claim. 
And I have represented to Mr. Duffin that 
for purposes of our motion to dismiss that it's not 
an argument that the county is going to make, that 
is that somehow because of what happened the county 
did not have an opportunity to investigate the 
claim. 
Our argument, as indicated in the motion 
to dismiss, relates to the requirements under the 
governmental immunity act that the notice be 
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directed and delivered to the county clerk. 
MR. DUFFIN: Would you be willing to 
stipulate, as part of that, that Kane County, as a 
public body, had the full opportunity to pursue the 
claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, as a 
result of the notice that was served? 
MR. STIRBA: I would rather do this: 
Rather than stipulate that as a factual matter, 
indicate what I've indicated, that we are not going 
to raise that as an argument with respect to our 
motion, and if you make that argument under the 
existing case law, you will not see any rebuttal 
that somehow that is not the case. 
MR. DUFFIN: I want to make sure -- often 
times stipulations -- and they've been tricky before 
on this question before, counsel. We're both aware 
of that. 
Mr. Stirba, on behalf of Kane County, will 
you stipulate that you will not argue and that there 
will not be a question raised or representation that 
Kane County did not have a full opportunity to 
pursue a timely investigation of the merits of the 
Bear River claim? 
MR. STIRBA: That is something that I will 
represent and stipulate that you will not see that 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971 
1 argument made or a resistance, if, otherwise, in 
2 your memorandum, you indicate what the policy 
3 considerations are, that they were fulfilled in this 
4 case. 
5 MR. DUFFIN: Counsel, there's a difference 
6 between you will not raise the argument and a 
7 stipulation that you will agree because that can be 
8 tricky. 
9 MR. STIRBA: Well, I don't think the 
10 record is really ambiguous at all, but you're asking 
11 essentially for a factual stipulation. I'm not 
12 prepared to do that. 
13 I am prepared, though, to make a record as 
14 to how this process will unfold, that you will make 
15 an argument that the policy underlying the Notice of 
16 Claim has been fulfilled in this case as articulated 
17 by the supreme court. 
13 The only opportunity we have to respond to 
19 that is in the reply memorandum, and I'm telling you 
20 that we will not argue -- we will not make that 
21 argument, as a matter of legal presentation or legal 
22 fact, that that policy consideration, under these 
23 facts, may very well have been fulfilled. That's 
24 not our motion. 
25 MR. DUFFIN: I don't know what we 
4\\ *\\ j * * \ <-s 
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stipulated to, Peter. 
MR. STIRBA: My word is my bond, Tom. 
MR. DUFFIN: I will accept your --
MR. STIRBA: What I've said I've said. I 
can't make it any clearer. 
MR. DUFFIN: Let's go off the record for a 
minute. 
(Off the record.) 
MR. DUFFIN: May we stipulate, Mr. Stirba, 
that you will not argue to the trial court or at the 
trial hearing, if that be the case, or in any --or 
to any appellate court that Kane County did not have 
an opportunity to timely investigate the merits of 
this case? 
MR. STIRBA: Yes, and the only -- the only 
caveat is, when you submit your memorandum in 
opposition to our motion to dismiss, I certainly --
if you otherwise do not accurately describe what the 
supreme court has said, I would feel it would be 
okay for me to point that out. 
MR. DUFFIN: Okay. All right. I don't 
think we -- I don't think I need Mr. McPherson. 
MR. STIRBA: Okay. So we've got an 
agreement that Mr. McPherson is gone, and let's just 
deal with Mr. Caroll at 1:00. 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (435) 652-9971 
7 
MR. DUFFIN: Okay. 
(Thereupon, the stipulation 
concluded at 12:05 p.m.) 
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